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OBJECTIVE LIST THEORIES 
GUY FLETCHER 
 
Ask someone what they want for themselves, for their loved ones, and for their friends and they will 
likely suggest a few things. Suppose that they answer with the following: health, friendships, 
romantic relationships, pleasure and enjoyment, happiness, achievement, knowledge. A conception 
of prudential value which says that well-being is promoted by this collection of items is an instance 
of an objective list theory.1  This chapter is divided into three parts. First I outline objective list 
theories of well-being. I then go on to look at the motivations for holding such a view before 
turning to objections to these theories of well-being. 
 
1. Just what are Objective List Theories? 
 
Unlike the case of hedonism and the desire-fulfilment theory of well-being, it is difficult to 
characterise objective list theories in general. This is partly because, to a greater extent than is true 
of hedonism and the desire-fulfilment theory, ‘objective list theory’ names something from within a 
very wide class of theories.2 A natural thought one might have: even if objective list theories are a 
wide class of theories we can still ask what all such theories necessarily have in common or, to put 
the point another way, what is constitutive of being an objective list theory. This brings us to the 
second and more significant reason why it is difficult to provide a clear and accurate 
characterisation of objective list theories, namely, the label ‘objective list theory’ is used 
inconsistently in the well-being literature. I will begin by outlining this inconsistency before 
explaining how I think we should proceed. 
 
It is uncontroversial that paradigmatic objective-list theories adhere to both of the following claims: 
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 attitude-independence: it is not the case that G is (non-instrumentally) good for some  
 agent X only if X, or some counterpart of X, has some pro-attitude towards G. 
  
 pluralism: there are a plurality of (non-instrumental) prudential goods. 
  
Note, first, that these theses are both couched in terms of non-instrumental goods. Henceforth I’ll 
drop the qualifier ‘non-instrumental’ but this should be read as implied throughout this chapter. 
Second, as is common in the literature, I express these claims only in terms of basic prudential 
goods. It is natural to assume that a paradigm objective list theory is committed to the 
corresponding claims about basic prudential bads. However, whilst this is a natural combination, an 
objective list theory need not hold that there are a plurality of bads, just as there are a plurality of 
goods.3 Whatever its plausibility it seems perfectly coherent to hold, for example, that there is a 
plurality of basic goods but only one basic prudential bad (pain, for example). 
 
Here are some examples of paradigmatic objective list theories, with their lists of basic prudential 
goods:  
 
 Finnis 
Life, Knowledge, Play, Aesthetic Experience, Sociability (friendship), Practical 
Reasonableness,  ‘Religion’. 
 
 Fletcher 
 Achievement, Friendship, Happiness, Pleasure, Self-Respect, Virtue. 
 
 Murphy 
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 Life, Knowledge, Aesthetic Experience, Excellence in Play and Work, Excellence in Agency, 
 Inner Peace, Friendship and Community, Religion, Happiness. 
 
 Parfit 
 Moral goodness, rational activity, development of abilities, having children and being a good 
 parent, knowledge, awareness of true beauty.4 
 
These theories are paradigm cases of objective list theories because they are consistent with each of 
attitude-independence and pluralism. Their consistency with pluralism is obvious - their lists have 
more than one member - and their consistency with attitude-independence stems from the fact that 
they do not claim that these items are good for a person only if they desire them. For example, 
Finnis makes this feature of his view abundantly clear thus:  
  
 It is obvious that a man who is well informed, etc., simply is better-off (other things being  
 equal) than a man who is muddled, deluded, and ignorant, that the state of the one is better 
 than the state of the other, not just in this particular case or that, but in all cases, as such,  
 universally, and whether I like it or not.5 
 
But why have I said that the theories above are only paradigmatic objective list theories? Why not 
simply define objective list theories as those which accept both attitude-independence and 
pluralism?  
 
The problem is that despite the paradigm cases of objective list theories embracing both attitude-
independence and pluralism there are two ways in which ‘objective list theory’ is used which falsify 
this as a view of what is definitive of objective list theories. 
 First, it has long been standard to divide theories of well-being in a tripartite way thus: 
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 Hedonism  Desire-fulfilment  Objective list  
 
For example, Derek Parfit (1984:493) writes that “[t]here are three kinds of theory” of self-interest 
or ‘what makes someone’s life go best’ and then proceeds to list ‘hedonistic theories…desire 
fulfilment theories…objective list theories”.6 This gives us a tripartite distinction among theories of 
well-being. On this categorisation, sufficiently common to be accurately regarded as orthodoxy, the 
category of ‘objective list theories’ thus covers every theory that is neither hedonism nor the desire-
fulfilment theory. And this makes trouble because not every theory that is distinct from hedonism 
and desire fulfilment theory accepts pluralism and attitude-independence. Consider for example the 
following theory: 
 
 Knowledgism: Knowledge is the only prudential good. 
 
Whatever its ultimate merits or lack thereof, knowledgism is a theory of well-being. It should 
therefore be possible to categorise it. Clearly, knowledgism is neither a form of hedonism nor 
desire-fulfilment theory. This means, according to the tripartite division stated above, knowledgism 
is an objective list theory. But knowledgism, though committed to attitude-independence, is 
inconsistent with pluralism. So knowledgism cannot be an objective list theory if objective list 
theories necessarily embrace both attitude-independence and pluralism. Thus the way in which the 
category of ‘Objective List theory’ is used to distinguish theories of well-being means that one 
cannot treat pluralism and attitude-independence as constitutive of objective list theories.7  
 
The previous reason for not treating attitude-independence and pluralism as constitutive of objective 
list theories was implicit, stemming as it did from the way in which the category of objective list 
theories is used. There is however a second, more explicit, reason not to treat commitment to 
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attitude-independence and pluralism as constitutive of objective list theories. This is the fact that the 
literature is flatly, and explicitly, inconsistent on this point. Objective list theories are sometimes 
explicitly defined as pluralistic:  
 
The objective list theory of well-being holds that a plurality of basic objective goods directly 
benefit people.8 
 
even though the idea that pluralism is constitutive of objective list is contradicted by the many times 
when people allow for the possibility of monistic objective list theories. For example, Roger Crisp 
writes: 
 But it is worth remembering, for example, that hedonism might be seen as one kind of ‘list’ 
 theory, and all list theories might then be opposed to desire theories as a whole.9 
 
And Chris Heathwood: 
 Also, if one-item lists are allowed, then objective list theories can be monistic. Hedonism is 
 sometimes thought of as such a theory.10 
 
Heathwood: 
 One concern for objective list theories, at least if they are pluralistic[…]11 
 
Shelly Kagan:  
 On this approach, what the hedonist is endorsing appears to be a version of an   
 objective theory…In effect, the hedonist is offering an objective list theory with a very short 
 list. Pleasure is an objective good, and it is the only such good.12 
 
Julia Markovitz: 
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This way of thinking about H[edonism] makes it an Objective List View (OL), with a very 
short list: pleasure is the only item on it.13 
 
Even though some of these come as part of conditional claims, they show that there is no consensus 
that objective list theories are pluralistic in the way that there is a consensus over what hedonism 
and desire-fulfilment theories claim.14  
 
It is for these two reasons that one cannot easily say what is constitutive of objective list theories. 
The literature sometimes treats pluralism as constitutive of objective list theories, sometimes uses 
‘objective list theory’ as a residual category, such that it could not incorporate pluralism, and 
sometimes explicitly allows monistic objective list theories. 
 
How then should we proceed? Well notice that the inconsistency in the usage of ‘objective list 
theory’ concerned only pluralism. There is unanimity that objective list theories are committed to 
Attitude Independence. For this reason, I think that the best way to carve up the logical space of 
theories of well-being is to say that ‘objective list theories’ are all and only those that specify 
particular things as non-instrumentally prudentially good (or bad) for people whether or not they 
have any pro (or con) attitude towards them. More succinctly, the essence of objective list theories 
is Attitude Independence. Some precedent for such a convention stems from the passages cited 
above, which allow for monistic Objective List theories, as well as from characterisations of 
objective list views such as Parfit’s: “On Objective List Theories, certain things are good or bad for 
us, whether or not we want to have the good things, or to avoid the bad things.”15 This also fits the 
taxonomy used by Allan Hazlett,16 which distinguishes Desire-Dependent and Desire-Independent 
theories (before then further dividing Desire-Independent theories according to whether they are 
monistic or pluralistic), and the discussions of how to categorise theories of well-being in Dorsey, 
Fletcher, and Woodard.17 One consequence of treating attitude-independence alone as constitutive 
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of objective list theories is that hedonism might then qualify as a particular instance of an objective 
list theory.18  
 
Let me recap what we have seen so far. I have shown that the label ‘objective list theory’ is used 
inconsistently in the well-being literature, such that one cannot spell out what is constitutive of 
objective list theories without contradicting at least some of the ways in which the label is 
consistently used. My suggestion for how to proceed from here was that it would be best to take 
attitude independence to be all that is constitutive of objective list theories, and that this would 
adequately fit the way the term is currently used (though for the reasons given above it could not fit 
all such uses of the label). However this second point is much less important. After all, better 
taxonomies of well-being may eschew the label ‘objective list theory’ altogether. The first point, 
however, is important as it is clear that ‘objective list theory’ is used inconsistently. So one must 
take care in using the label. In the rest of this entry I will mostly be concerned with pluralistic 
objective list theories, given that many of the objections to the view, and motivations for it, make 
most sense in the case of pluralistic views. 
 
One final thing to do in this section is to clear up two potential confusions that one might have 
about objective list theories.  
 
First, it is not constitutive of an objective list theory that it hold that the constituent goods are either 
good simpliciter or morally good, aside from being good for people. Of course any particular 
objective list theorist might also hold that the goods are good simpliciter etc. but that is an extra, 
strictly separate, commitment.19 This means that objective list theories are strictly neutral as to the 
truth of welfarism (the view that welfare is all that is non-instrumentally valuable or the only thing 
that generates practical reasons).  
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Second, the objective list theory gives no fundamental role to people’s beliefs about what is good 
for them. Thus we are not free, according to the objective list theories, to ‘devise our own lists’ so 
to speak. An objective list theorist believes that the items on the list are all and only the things that 
are good for all humans.20 
 
Having explained what ‘objective list theories’ have in common I move on now to examining the 
reasons for and against holding such a view. Of course each such argument or objection is the 
subject of sustained reflection so I only detail the opening moves in the debate about each. 
 
2. In Favour of Objective List Theories 
 
A. Pre-theoretical judgements 
 
Objective list theory is, I suggest, analogous to common-sense morality in being a kind of widely-
held starting point when thinking about well-being. It thus seems to function as the view that one 
holds before and until one is persuaded to adopt one of the other philosophical theories of well-
being.21 As I noted at the beginning of the chapter if you ask people what they ultimately want for 
themselves and their loved ones they will typically give you a list of items – health, pleasure, 
friendship, knowledge, achievement – without thinking that these can all be reduced to one value 
and without thinking that the list is determined by what their loved ones in fact desire. Thus one 
ground that might be offered for holding an objective list theory is that it is supported by our pre-
theoretic intuitive judgements about well-being, or the judgements that we make about well-being 
outside of, or before, philosophical thinking about the nature of well-being. That is to say, one 
might argue that our pre-theoretical judgements — judgements reflected in the prudential choices 
we make, the way in which we give prudential advice, and the way in which we care for family and 
friends — are some defeasible evidence in favour of objective list theories.  
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One might dispute this observation, by giving an account of why our everyday prudential 
judgements are actually better evidence for some other theory of well-being. Alternatively, and I 
think more plausibly, an opponent might concede that the observation is correct — that objective 
list is a common starting point and a widely held view among non-philosophers — but dispute its 
significance, arguing that it is weak or no evidence for objective list theories. One ground for this 
might be the fact that it is pre-theoretic judgements that are being appealed to, where an opponent of 
an objective list theory might think that such judgements are naive or unlikely to be accurate. How 
you think progress is to be made on this issue is likely to depend on one’s background views of how 
much trust we should place in pre-theoretic intuitions.   
 
Another kind of argument for objective list theories is that they steer a middle course between 
hedonism and the desire-fulfilment theory and thus avoids strong objections to these views. These 
objections I will label ‘too few prudential goods’ and ‘too many prudential goods’.22 
 
B. Too few prudential goods 
 
Hedonism is subject to a ‘too few prudential goods’ objection because it claims that only pleasures 
contribute to well-being. Notice that most objections to hedonism do not dispute that pleasure 
contributes to well-being. Rather, objections to hedonism tend to target the hedonist thesis that only 
pleasure contributes to well-being.  
 
Take Nozick’s experience machine objection.23 Nozick imagines a machine that one could plug into 
and enjoy pleasurable experiences. One might, for example, have the pleasurable experience of 
winning the world cup, of writing the great American novel, or simply living a very happy life 
surrounded by loving family and friends. The issue that the example brings out is what to think 
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about lives which are very pleasurable but which are plugged into such a machine. The objection is 
used to support the following claim: things other than pleasurable and painful experiences 
determine our level of well-being.  
 
Of course, the experience machine objection does not show, or even purport to show, that the 
experiential quality of our lives is completely irrelevant to well-being. But it does provide strong 
evidence that there are more things than pleasure that can affect our well-being. This is an instance 
of the general class of ‘too few prudential goods’ objection to hedonism. One piece of evidence in 
favour of objective list theories is their being able to avoid the ‘too few prudential goods’ objection 
that hedonism is subject to. 
 
C. Too many prudential goods 
 
Desire-fulfilment theory, at least in its simplest form, is subject to a ‘too many prudential goods’ 
objection. One particularly well known form of this objection is the ‘scope problem’.24 The problem 
is that if, as desire fulfilment theory claims,25 someone’s desiring something is sufficient for its 
being good for them then anything that someone desires is good for them. However, this seems to 
make many things good for people which plausibly are not. 26 
 
To take one example, suppose that you desire that there is sentient life elsewhere in the universe.27 
According to the desire-fulfilment theory, if there is such life, this satisfaction of your desire is good 
for you. But it seems implausible that the existence of sentient life elsewhere in the universe is, 
itself, good for you. And there are limitless other such examples, stemming from the fact that we 
have desires for a wide range of things that do not seem plausibly good for us. Worries about such 
cases have typically led desire-fulfilment theorists to seek to restrict the relevant range of desires in 
some way.28 
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One might similarly think that perfectionist theories of well-being are subject to one, or both, of the 
too many goods / too few goods objections and one might therefore hold an objective list theory 
because one is also unpersuaded by perfectionist theories.29 Thus one kind of motivation for an 
objective list theory is it apparent ability to avoid such ‘too many prudential goods’ objections.   
 
The too many /too few prudential goods objections taken together push towards the view that 
pleasure and a, limited, class of other things are good for people. In light of that, one might think of 
objective list theories as the natural go-to option for those dissatisfied with alternate theories on the 
grounds considered above.  
 
D. Piecemeal arguments for specific goods 
 
Another style of argument for an objective list theory is that of arguing for the prudential value of 
particular goods on the list. For example, one might argue for an objective list theory by arguing 
that knowledge is prudentially valuable irrespective of whether it is desired or pleasurable, thus 
contradicting the claims of desire-fulfilment theory and hedonism. One example of this strategy is 
Finnis, who provides a specific argument to support the claim that knowledge belongs on the 
objective list, arguing that the contrary position is self-refuting.30 One can, of course, do the same 
with any other candidate prudential good that is included on one’s objective list. Thus one way of 
arguing for an objective list theory is to argue piecemeal for its particular constituents. 
 
E. Arguments from the nature of prudential value 
 
Objective list theories are theories of which things hold prudential value. One might try to argue for 
an objective list theory answer on this question by, first, defending a particular view of the nature of 
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prudential value – what it is for something to be prudentially valuable – before then arguing that an 
objective list theory is a consequence of such a view.  
 
F. Defensive Manoeuvres 
 
The final way of motivating objective list theories is that of performing defensive manoeuvres on its 
behalf, by trying to nullify potential objections. In the next section I will cover some standard 
objections to objective list theories and also explain the best way for the objective list theorist to 
reply to each of the standard objections, thus demonstrating some such defensive manoeuvres on 
behalf of the objective list theorist.  
 
3. Problems and Objections to Objective List Theories, and replies 
 
Before starting properly let me note that many objections to particular objective list theories will 
depend upon their constituent claims - their list of goods and any further claims they make about the 
constituents of the list. In discussing problems and objections I will largely abstract from particular 
objective list theories and consider problems and objections which apply to such theories generally 
(even if to different extents). 
 
A. Arbitrariness and Explanatory Impotence 
 
Ben Bradley gives a succinct spelling-out of a cluster of related objections to objective list theories, 
objections centred on the idea that theories are problematically arbitrary, nothing but an 
‘unconnected heap’, or somehow explanatorily unsatisfying.31 For example: 
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[P]luralism seems objectionably arbitrary. Whatever the composition of the list, we can 
always ask: why should these things be on the list? What do they have in common? What is 
the rational principle that yields the results that these things, and no others, are the things that 
are good?32 
 
Although Bradley couches this as an objection to ‘pluralism’ at least part of his objection(s) apply 
to monistic objective list theory, such as knowledgism or hedonism, equally well and one reply for 
the objective list theorist to make is to argue that the objective list theory is no more burdened by 
these challenges than any other theory of well-being. We can ask: “why is pleasure (or knowledge 
or…) alone of prudential value?” or “what is the rational principle that determines that pleasure (or 
knowledge or…) contributes to well-being”.  
 
The same goes for desire-fulfilment theory. Desire-fulfilment theorists spend little or no time 
providing an explanation of why desire fulfilment contributes to well-being. And to the extent that 
the challenge to the objective list theory is a good one, perfectionist theories of well-being owe us 
an answer to the question: why is the exercise and development of our capacities good for us? 
 
There are two good reasons to think that these fundamental questions are, at best, extremely difficult 
to answer. First, the fundamental tenets of a theory of well-being are necessary truths and, as such, 
might be incapable of further explanation. Finally, given that the fundamental tenets of a theory of 
well-being are purported evaluative truths, there is a major epistemological challenge to all theories 
of well-being stemming from the fact that we have no well worked out account of how knowledge 
of evaluative truths is possible. Thus Bradley points out difficulties for the objective list theory but 
not for the objective list theory in particular. 
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This reply has some merit. Note however that it really shows only that all theories of well-being 
share the same kind of challenge. But this leaves open the possibility that objective list theories 
(strictly speaking, pluralist ones) have an especially difficult instance of the challenge. One reason 
for thinking this is that it has to provide an account of why each constituent goods is a fundamental 
prudential value. Thus if we are comparing the costs of the theories of well-being it is a pro tanto 
cost of (pluralistic) objective list theories that they will need to provide a fundamental explanation 
of, or explanation of our knowledge of, more than one type of good. 
 
A final thread to Bradley’s objection is a challenge to the (pluralist) objective list theorist to provide 
an explanation of the commonality between the items on the list. If the idea is that the objective list 
theorist must provide an explanation of why the items on the list have the common property of 
enhancing well-being then this collapses into the previous objection. An alternative way of reading 
it is as a request simply for an explanation of what properties the items on the list have in common. 
Of course one answer that the objective list theorist is committed to is that the items on the list have 
the property enhancing well-being. However that is trivial so we must read the demand, instead, as 
one of asking what other properties the items on the list have in common, aside from contributing to 
well-being.  
 
At this point the objective list theorist has options. They can either question the legitimacy of the 
demand by asking what reason we have to expect the items on the list will have some property in 
common aside from contributing to well-being. Another, more positive, strategy is simply to note 
that the items on any plausible objective list will have points of commonality.33 For example, any 
list with pleasure and happiness on the list has the commonality that these two goods enjoy, namely 
experiential quality, and any list with friendship, virtue and self-respect on the list can point to the 
traits of character and affective states which are common to these goods. Thus if such a demand is 
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legitimate, there seems nothing intractable about the demand to provide commonalities between the 
goods postulated by an objective list theory. 
 
Bradley voices another complaint against objective list theories thus: 
  
 [P]luralists must tell us, for example, how to compare the effects on well-being of a certain 
 amount of pleasure with the effect of a certain amount of knowledge…To the extent that the 
 pluralist refuses to tackle these questions she abandons the philosophical project of   
 understanding well-being; she admits defeat. A theory that tells us that A, B, and C are  
 intrinsically good, but does not tell us why those things are on the list or how to weight them, 
 does not give what we initially wanted out of a theory of well-being. We wanted   
 enlightenment, but we are provided instead with a list and told not to look any deeper. This is 
 not theorising, but a refusal to theorize.34 
 
This passage contains at least two separate objections. One is that discussed above (the ‘why are 
those things are on the list’ worry) but there is a distinct worry, one echoing the ‘unconnected heap 
of duties’ criticism of ‘deontic pluralism’ (commonsense morality).35 This worry is about how 
much detail the objective list theorist has in their theory. If one were to propose that A, B, and C are 
the only constituents of well-being and then simply refuse to tackle the issue of how they are to be 
weighed against each other then this is certainly a demerit in the theory (or the theorist?). Of course, 
an objective list theory should either tackle these questions (or, alternatively, tackle the issue of why 
such questions cannot be answered).  
 
However, whilst this shows that a very negative and dogmatic kind of objective list theory is 
unsatisfying for that reason, this type of objection applies to all theories of well-being. What it 
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highlights is that there is much more work to do than simply specifying what is to go on the list. But 
equivalent worries apply to hedonism and desire-fulfilment theories.  
 
Take hedonism first. Hedonists need to provide, for example, an account of how to weight: (a) the 
various elements of a pleasure experience, in calculating the prudential value of a pleasure  
(b) the various elements of a pain experience, in calculating the prudential disvalue of a pain and (c) 
how to trade off prudential value and disvalue from pleasure and pain in determining someone’s 
overall level of well-being. To put some meat on these bones, note that it is not obvious how to 
compare (i) a pain/pleasure which is extremely intense but short lasting against (ii) a pain/pleasure 
that is mild but long-lasting. Nor is it obvious how one arrives at an overall level of well-being from 
someone’s level of pleasure and pain. Nor is it obvious that there is one homogeneous kind of e.g. 
pain (compare, for instance, emotional heartache with the feeling of burning one’s hand), and if so 
one must find a way of comparing different types of pain (or explaining why there is some 
common, comparable, pain experience which they all have in common).  
 
Move now to desire-fulfilment theory. We might ask of such a theory how it calculates the 
prudential value of the satisfaction of a pleasure and how it weighs desire satisfactions against non-
satisfactions. A very simple form of the theory has an answer, in terms of the intensity of the desire, 
such that desiring P to degree 10 and it being the case that P has prudential value of + 10 (and 
desiring P to degree 10 and it being the case that not-P has prudential disvalue of -10). But any 
more sophisticated desire-fulfilment theory, such as one that takes the relevant desires to be those 
that meet some counterfactual condition or to be those of a relevant counterpart, will have work to 
do in specifying exactly how much prudential value or disvalue a desire-fulfilment or non-
fulfilment has. 
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Overall, then, Bradley is right that it is unsatisfying if an objective list theory says nothing about 
e.g. relative weightings. But even if that applies to all extant objective list theories this does not 
constitute an objection to objective list theories as such. It shows that objective list theorists have 
work to do, and they might have an especially large degree of it, but it is nonetheless work of the 
same type as that which hedonists and desire-fulfillment theorists have to do. 
 
B. Alienation 
 
A mistaken objection to objective list theories is that they are elitist or paternalistic, where this is 
the claim that such theories suggest that people should be compelled to have the constituents of the 
list. The objective list theory, like all theories of well-being, is not a theory of what, if anything, 
people ought to be compelled to have. One could in principle combine the objective list theory with 
the most stringent anti-paternalism one could imagine. Thus objective list theories, just as much as 
hedonism and desire-fulfilment theories have no necessary connection to paternalism. 
 
A better objection to the objective list theory is the worry that objective list theories might fail to be 
sufficiently subject-sensitive and thereby provide a conception of well-being that is potentially 
alienating.36 What is the worry? An influential way of putting it is thus: 
 
 It would be an intolerably alienated conception of someone’s good to imagine that it might  
 fail in any way to engage him.37 
 
One could develop this worry in a number of ways.  
 
One way is as the thought that a conception of well-being is problematic to the extent that it is 
insensitive to a person’s affective states and volitions (their tastes, preferences, desires, interests, 
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etc) such that a person could have a very high level of well-being, according to the theory, even if 
they were affectively unengaged. This alienation worry certainly applies to some objective list 
theories. It certainly applies to knowledgism, as described above, as one could easily imagine 
someone who had a lot of knowledge but who just was not interested in knowledge, or who did not 
care about it. In this way knowledgism leaves open the possibility of someone having a very high 
level of well-being despite being completely affectively cold. Thus a conception of well-being that 
said that only knowledge had prudential value is problematic in giving rise to the possibility of such 
disconnect between what is good for a person and their affective states. 
 
However, whilst some objective list theories clearly provide alienating conceptions of well-being 
this does not clearly apply to all objective list theories. There is nothing to stop an objective list 
theorist from taking a constitutive strategy on this question and arguing that their theory avoids 
alienation because the objective list elements are (necessarily) constituted by the agent’s affective 
states and volitions. For example, taken an objective list theory with: pleasure, happiness, friendship 
and achievement on the list. Call this four goods for brevity. Each of the four goods are clearly (at 
least) partly constituted by affective, attitudinal or volitional states of the person. Thus no-one can 
be in such states without, ipso facto, being in these states. For example, a person who experiences 
pleasure is in the affective states which constitute pleasure, the person who achieves something has 
a volition towards the outcome which they have attained, a person who is happy has the affective 
and / or attitudinal states which are constitutive of happiness, and a person who has friendship has 
the attitudes of concern and enjoyment which are constitutive of friendship. There is thus, according 
to four goods, no possibility of someone having a high level of well-being whilst being left 
affectively cold. Thus, an objective list theorist might argue, there is no more problem with 
alienation for this type of objective list theory than for hedonism or the desire-fulfilment theory.38 
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Someone might think that the reply in the previous paragraph does not fully address the alienation 
worry because someone could have these four states (and necessarily therefore be in positive 
affective states) but lack any second-order desires to be in those states (or, have a second-order 
desire not to be in those states). According to four goods such desires for or against the four goods 
are, in and of themselves, irrelevant to whether these items contribute to well-being. These four 
goods are the things that contribute to prudential value, whether you desire them or not. Thus in and 
of themselves whether you desire them is irrelevant.39 One might then object that the alienation 
intuition is thereby left unsatisfied because there is this possibility of an agent who does not care 
about the things which, according to four goods, hold prudential value for them. To support this one 
might argue that the alienation intuition cannot be fully satisfied by the constitutive strategy and 
that alienation can only be avoided some other way.  
 
As this reply brings out, it is no easy matter to work out precisely what the anti-alienation intuition 
is as the issues involved are very subtle. As a result how plausible one will find the solution 
exemplified by four goods, or the objection to it in the previous paragraph, will depend a lot on 
one’s way of thinking about the alienation worry.  
 
There is a danger here that we might reach a dialectical impasse. The constitutive strategy is 
certainly one that an objective list theory can take to avoid the alienation worry (construed one 
way). However some will argue, as in the previous paragraph, that the constitutive strategy is 
insufficient on the grounds that it still leaves open the possibility of problematic alienation. If this 
objection rests on the thought that avoiding alienation requires, instead, an object strategy — that of 
making it a necessary condition of some G being good for a person X that X have a pro attitude 
towards G — this begs the question against the objective list theory (given its acceptance of attitude 
independence) and in favour of something like the desire-fulfilment theory. This is not to claim that 
the object strategy is not the truth about avoiding alienation. But there is a danger of reaching a 
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stalemate, with objective list theories like four goods claiming that they accommodate the anti-
alienation intuition and opponents arguing for a stronger version of the anti-alienation intuition, one 
that could only be satisfied by an object strategy. At this point a lot depends on the relative merits 
of these two ways of avoiding alienation. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In this entry I first outlined the way in which the label ‘objective list theory’ has been used, pointing 
out that, whilst paradigmatic kinds of objective list theories are pluralist, the literature is 
inconsistent on this point. It was clear that what is essential to objective list theories is a rejection of 
the idea that something is good for someone only if they have some pro-attitude towards it.  
 
I then considered some of the reasons that lead people to adopt objective list theories and some of 
the objections to the view. I argued that the challenges to objective list theories often highlight 
epistemic or explanation problems faced by all theories of well-being (though not perhaps to equal 
extents) or the need for further refinement of the views of the sort which can also be demanded of 
other theories of well-being.40 
 
Notes 
                                                 
1 I use ‘prudential value’ and ‘well-being’ interchangeably. 
2 Of course there are differences between different hedonist and desire-fulfilment theories, so each 
can also be accurately thought of as a range of theories. But it is uncontroversial that one knows 
much more about someone’s theory of well-being if one knows they are a hedonist or a desire-
fulfilment theorist than if one knows that they are an objective list theorist. 
3 This brings out another terminological difficulty, namely that the literature on prudential value 
tends to use ‘well-being’ to refer to each of (i) a person’s level of prudential value as a whole and 
(ii) more narrowly, the positive constituents thereof (where this is distinguished from ‘ill-being’). 
Note that this ambiguity is also present in talk of ‘prudential value’.   
4 Finnis (1980) Note that the scare quotes around ‘religion’ are present in the original text. Fletcher 
(2013). Murphy (xxx). Parfit (1984:xxx). This is not necessarily Parfit’s view but it is a theory he 
mentions. 
5  Finnis (1980: 72) (Italics in original). 
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6 This might not be the best way to read Parfit as he might be distinguishing extant theories, rather 
than all possible theories. 
7 Woodard (201x), Dorsey (2011).  
8 Rice (2013: 196) Lin (tbc). 
9 Crisp (2013). 
10 Heathwood (in progress). 
11 Heathwood (2010: 647). 
12 Kagan (1992). 
13 Markovitz (2009, handout 11) 
14 One might try to write these off as deviant uses or errors. But this is implausible.  
15 One might point to Parfit’s use of the plural as evidence of him presupposing pluralism but that 
seems strained. Why deal with an essential tenet of this kind of view implicitly in this fashion?  
16 Hazlett (2013). 
17 Dorsey (2011), Fletcher (2013), Woodard (2013). See also Raibley (2014). 
18 Complication: you might think that whether hedonism is an objective list theory depends on the 
nature of pleasure. If so, feel free to read my claim as ‘hedonism should then be categorised as one 
particular instance of an objective list theory, given the assumption of a certain kind of theory of 
pleasure’.  
19 The denial of such neutrality on the part of the objective list theorist is the best sense I can make 
of this intriguing passage from Parfit (1984: 499) “[T]here is one important difference between on 
the one hand Preference-Hedonism and the Success Theory, and on the other hand the Objective 
List Theory. The first two kinds of theory give an account of self interest which is purely 
descriptive - which does not appeal to facts about value. This account appeals only to what that a 
person does and would prefer, given full knowledge of the purely non-evaluative facts about the 
alternatives. In contrast, the Objective List Theory appeals directly to what it claims to be facts 
about value.” (My italics). 
20  ‘Humans’ is possibly too specific. One could easily imagine objective list theories being couched 
as claims about the well-being of people. 
21 This is admittedly a semi hunch, informed by the experience of surveying undergraduates taking 
courses that include well-being as a topic.  
22 To be clear these objections can be used by those who adopt views other than objective list theory 
so it’s not that they uniquely favour objective list theories. 
23 Nozick (1974:42-45). 
24 Overvold (1980). 
25 I am here only talking about the basic form of the view, for simplicity. 
26 Desire-fulfilment theory is also commonly thought to make self-sacrifice impossible. I doubt that 
this is correct but it is widely claimed. 
27 Note you do not desire to meet sentient life and you do not form the desire to know that there is 
sentient life or to be the one that discovers it, you simply desire that it be there. Even if unlikely, 
such a desire is surely possible, which is all that the objection requires. 
28 See also Darwall (2002:27). 
29 Hurka (1993), Bradford (this volume), Dorsey (2010). 
30 Finnis (1980: 74). Note: I do not say that the argument is successful. For criticism see Varelius 
(2013:18-20). 
31 Bradley (2009: 16) I focus on Bradley’s discussion as it provides unusually clear and forthright 
versions of critical responses to objective list theories which one often hears in discussion but which 
are not often put into print. Let me note that Bradley’s discussion is not part of a sustained 
discussion of objective list theories so I in no way suggest that he should have considered the 
possible replies that will be mentioned here. See also Sumner (1996). 
32 Bradley (2009: 16). 
33 One such strategy is given by Fletcher (2012). 
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34 Bradley (2009: 16) 
35 On this issue see McNaughton (1996), Joseph (1931: 67). 
36 For discussion of this worry see Sumner (1996: 27). 
37 Railton (2003: 19). For more detailed discussion of this intuition see Rosati (1995 & 1996). For 
critical discussion see Sarch (2011). 
38 For elaboration see Fletcher (2013). 
39 It would be relevant if the person who experienced these four things were also filled with regret 
or anguish, for example, but in and of itself their desire to have (or not to have) pleasure, happiness, 
friendship and achievement does not, itself, make a difference to the prudential value or the four 
goods. 
40 For comments and discussion many thanks to Steve Campbell, Connie Rosati, Debbie Roberts, 
Allan Hazlett. 
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